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thvir action, as it is admitted we would have the right to do in a
proper case.

What might be the effect of the record of the state court being
filed in the Federal court before the term next after the filing of
the bond and petition in the suit in the state court, upon the
general status of the case, it is not necessary to consider. There
possibly might be a question whether the case would be in every
respect before the Federal court prior to its next term.
It may be admitted there are difficulties in any view we may
take of this part of the case, but we are at a loss to understand how
tie fact that the state court has had the opportunity to pass upon

the application, can alone confer the right of removal, when it is
admitted that the action or non-action of the state court may be
immaterial.
If the petitioner has brought himself and is within the terms of
the law and the right of removal is complete, then when there is
added to that a copy of the record duly filed in the Federal court
(and special bail given when requisite), the act of removal has
taken place.
Motion overruled.
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ADMIRALTY.

State Liens for bulding Yssels-ltaritime Contracts.-An assign-

ment of error in the highest court of a state to the decision of an in-

irior state court, that the latter had decided a particular state statute
valid and constitutional," and a judgment entry by the latter court
'hat the statute was not " in any respect repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States," is not specific enough to give jurisdiction to the
'zupreme Court of the United States under section 709 of the Revised
m..utes; there being nothing else anywhere in the record to show to
which provision of the Constitution of the United States the statute
was alleged to be repugnant: .Edcardsv. Elliott et al., 21 Wall.
However, where the record showed that the case was one of the assertion of a lien under a state statute for building a vessel at a town on
From J. W. Wallace. Esq., 'Reporter ; to appear in vol. 21 of his 'Reports.
2 From ]lon. Edwin B. Smith, Reporter ; to appear in vol. 63 Maine Reports.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Pcnna. Reports.
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what tile court might perhaps judicially notice was an estuary of the
sea, and where the entry of judgment showed also that the court had
adjudged " that the contract hbr building the vessel in question was not
a maritine contract, and that the remedy given by the lien law of the
state did not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States."
the court held that the latter statement, in view of the whole record,
was sufficient to give this court jurisdiction : Id.
A maritime lien does not arise on a contract to furnish materials for
the purpose of building a ship ; and in respect to such contracts it is
competent for the states to create such liens as their legislatures may
deem just. and expedient, not amounting to a regulation of commerce.
and to enact reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the nmode of
their enforcemeint, if not inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the admiralty courts: Id.
AssuMPsIT.

See Limitations.

ATTORNEY.
See Foreign Judgment.
NYegligence of-Dealings with Client-Estoppelby Tine.-An attorney cannot be charged with negligence when he accepts. as a correct
exposition of the law, a decision of the Supreme Court of his state upon
the question of the liability of stockholders of corporations of the state
in advance of any decision thereon by this court : . rsh v. Whitmore,
21 Wall.
Where an attorney sold bonds of a client at public sale, and bought
them in himself, at their full value at the time, and the client was aware
of the purchase and acquiesced in it for twelve years, it is then too late
for the client to attempt to impeach the validity of the sale : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.

Preferenee-ntenfion.-When the issue to be decided is whether a
judgment against an insolvent was obtained with a view to gec a preference, the intention, of the bankrupt is the turning-point of the case.
and all the circumstances which go to show such intent should be considered : Little, Assignee, v. Alexander 21 Wall.
Hence, when an ordinance of a state gave a preference as to time of
trial in the courts in suits on debts contracted after a certain date, and
the insolvent debtor gave his son and niece new notes fir an old debt.
so as to enable them to procure judgments before his other creditors,
the fact giat the ordinance was void does not repel the inferencP of intent to give and obtain a preference, and when a judgmnt was so obtained which gave priority of lien it will to that extent be null and
void: I.
Preference-Four MAonths-Act of Bankrulte.-Turner, October
21st 1871, gave Sleek for value a judgment-note, on which he entered
judgment February 26th 1872; an execution issued March l1th, and
his personal property was levied on; April 10th his creditors filed a
petition of bankruptcy against him ; April 11th his personal property
was sold by the sheriff; he was adjudged a bankrupt and an assignee
appointed July 5th; the proceeds of sheriff's sale were brought into
court: Held, the note having been given four months before the proceedings in bankruptcy, that Sleek's judgment was not in fraud of the
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Bankrupt Law and was entitled to be paid from the proeceds of the
sheriff's sale: Sleek v. Turner's Assinee, 76 Pa.
Turner being passive in the entry of the judgment and the issuing
of the execution, had not given Sleek a preference; the ease was no
stronger than it would have been if judgment had been obtained in a
suit on a plain note, no defence being interposed : Id.
Mere passive non-resistance in an insolvent debtor will not, under the

Bankrupt Laws, invalidate a judgment and levy on his property when
the debt is due and lie has no defence : Id.
Though the judgment-creditor may know the insolvency of the
debtor, his levy and seizure are not void, nor any violation of the
Bankrupt Law : .d.
Giving Jwlgmet-note-I'refrence.-The giving, by a debtor, for a
consideration of equal value passing at the time, of a warrant of attorney
to confess judgment, or of that which, under the Code of New York, is
the equivalent of such warrant, and there called a " confession of judgment," is not an act of bankruptcy, though such warrant or " confession"
be not entered of record, but on the contrary be kept as such things
often or ordinarily are, in the creditor's own custody, and with their
existence unknown to others. The creditor may enter judgment of
record on them when he pleases (even upon insolvency apparent), and
issue execution and sell. Such action is valid and not in fraud of the
Bankrupt Law unless he be assisted by the debtor: Clark, Assignee v.
Jsclb. 21 Wall.
A creditor, having by execution obtained a valid lien on his debtor's
stock of goods, of an amount in value greater than the amount of the
execution, may, up to the proceedings in bankruptcy, without violating
any provision of the Bankrupt Act, receive from the debtor bills receivable and accounts due him, and a small sum of cash, to the amount of
the execution ; the execution being thereupon released, and the judgment declared satisfied : Id.
B3ILLS AND NOTES.
See Cofict of Laws.
Parchaserfor VTl.-On the face of a note on a printed form, made
by Frey payable to the order of Mishler at the bank of Reed, "without
deileation for value received ;" was, " credit the drawer," which was
not signed by Mishler. The note was endorsed by him, discounted by
Reed and the proceeds passed to the credit of Frey. In an action by
Reed against Mishler, evidence by him that it was an accousmnodation
note, that lie declined to endorse unless the proceeds went to his credit,
-and declined to sign under "credit the drawer," and endorsed with the
understanding that the proceeds were to go to his credit, was inadmis-,ible without notice to Reed of these facts when lie discounted the
note : illlshler v. Reed & flenderson, 76 Pa.
Reed discounting the note without knowledge that Mishler was to
control the proceeds, was a bondfide purchaser for value, and could not
be affected by an understanding between Mishler and Frey : d.
Not subscribing " credit the drawer," was not notice to Reed, but, in
connection with the endorsement, was evidence that the parties did not
intend to use it according to the printed form : Ji.
That the note was in the possession of the maker before due, was not
evidence that he had paid it: Id.
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VUted States Bonds and M\otes.-The bonds and treasury notes of
the United States, payable to holder or bearer at a definite future time,

are negomtiable commercial paper, and their transfierability is subject to
the commercial law of other paper of that character : Vermilje & Co. v.
.Adams Express Company, 21 Wall.
Where such paper is overdue, a purchaser takes subject to the rights
of antecedent holders to the same extent as in other paper bought after
its maturity: Id.
No usage or custom among bankers and brokers dealing in such paper
can be proved in contravention of this rule of law. Tliy cannot in
their own interest, by violations of the law, change it:. d.
It is their duty, when served with notice of the loss of such paper by
the rightful owner, after maturity, to make memoranda or lists, or adopt,
some other reasonable mode of reference, where the notice identifies the
paper, to enable thcm to recall the service of notice : 11.
Hence treasury notes of the United States, stolen from -,n express
company and sold for value after due in the regular course of business,
may be recovered of the purchaser by the express company, which
had succeeded to the right of the original owner: .1d.
BOND. See Evidence.
Signing in blhnkc-Fraudulentfilling ip-Liabiity of Surety.-A
person who signs, as surety, a printed fbrm of government bond, already
signed by another as principal, but the spaces in which for names, dates,
amounts, &c., remain blank, and who then gives it to the person who
has signed as principal, in order that lie may fill the blanks with a sum
agreed on between the two parties as the sum to be put there, and wjtlh
the names of two sureties who shall each be worth another suni agreed
on, and then have those two persons sign it, makes such person signing
as principal his agent to fill up the blanks and procure the sureties, and
if such person fraudulently fill up the blanks with a larger suni than
that agreed on between the two persons and have the names of worthless
sureties inserted, and such sureties to sign the bond, and the bond thus
filled up and signed be delivered by the principal to the government,
who accepts it in the belief that it has been properly executed, the party
so wronged cannot, on suit on the bond, again set up the private understandings which lie had with the principal: Butler v. Liited States,
21 Wall.
See ConstitutionalLaw.
CITIZEN.
CO3IMON CARRIER.

Expiress Company- Sti2,ulation as to Liimitation in Time of Litzbility.-An agreement between an express company, a common carrier
in the habit of carrying small packages, that the -company shall not be
held liable for any loss of or damage to a package whatever, delivered to
it, unless claim should be made therefor within ninety days from its delivery to the company, is an agreement which such company can rightfully make, the time required for transit between the place where the
package is delivered to the company and that to which it is consigned
not being long; in the present case a single day : Express Companly v.
Cablwell. 21 Wall.
VOL. XXIII.M-66
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CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Draft payable ht another State- Usury-Equity of Paerchaser.-The
acceptance of*a draft dated in one state and drawn by a resident of such
'tate on the resident of another, and by the latter accepted without
funds and purely for the accommodation of the former, and then returned to him to be negotiated in the state where he resides, and the
proceeds to be used in his business there-he to provide for its payment-is, after it has been negotiated and in the hands of a bonafide
holder for value and without notice of equities, to be regarded as a contract made in the state where the draft is dated and drawn, even though
by the terms of the acceptance the draft is payable in the state where
the acceptors reside : Tilden, v. Blair, 21 Wall.
It is accordingly to be governed by the law of the former state; and
if by the law of' that state the holder of it, who had purchased it in a
course of business without notice of equities, is entitled to recover the
sum he paid for it, though he bought it usurously, he may recover such
'urn, though by the law of the state where the draft was accepted and
made payable, and where usury made a contract wholly void, he could
not: Id.
A purchaser of a bill or note who purchases such paper as that above
described, though a broker, is not a lender of money on it, and if he
purchase honestly and without notice of equities-there being nothing
on the face of the draft to awaken suspicion-he can recover the full
amount of the draft: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

See Taxation.

Citizenslhp-Rigltt of Suffrage-Fourteenth Amendment.-The word
citizen" is often used to convey the idea of membership in a nation:
Minor v. .lappersett,21 Wall.
In that sense, women, if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction
of the United States, have always been considered citizens of the United
States, as much so before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution as since: Id.
The right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
and that amendment does not add to these privileges and immunities.
It simply furnishes additional guaranty for the protection of such as
the citizen already had : 17.
At the time of the adoption of that amendment, suffrage was not coextensive with the citizenship of the states ; nor was it at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution : Id.
Neither the Constitution nor the fourteenth amendment made all
citizens voters : Id.
A provision in a state constitution which confines the right of voting
to "male citizens of the United States," is no violation of the Federal
Constitution. In such a state women have no right to vote : Id.
CORPORATION.

Cancellation of Subscription-Estoppel by Acts of Secretar.-A
mutual insurance company in its policies reserved the right to cancel
them for non-payment of assessments for thirty days. Shoemaker insured in the company ; an assessment on him being unpaid less than
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thirty days, he assigned his policy to defendant with approval of the
company. After tle assessment had been unpaid for thirty lays, the
secretary informed defendant " the company cancels all policies ol which
assessment is not paid in thirty days." In a suit for assessments afterwards made against defendant, Ield, that the company was bound by
the letter of the secretary, and it justified the defendant in believing
that the policy was cancelled, and if he acted on such belief, they could
not recover the assessments against him, although the policy had not
been cancelled on their books : Columbia Ins. Co. v. 11'4sonlteimer', 76
Pa.
The secretary was the proper organ between the plaintiff and defendant; it was within the scope of his authority to inform defbndant of the
cancellation of the policy, and this was binding on the company : 11.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See lBankriptc,.

EJECTMENT.

Party inrossession cannot bring.-The plaintiff made a contract with
defendant to take timber from plaintiff's land; defendant entered to
cut the timber; plaintiff remaining in possession and alleging that the
contract was fraudulent, &c., brought ejeetment. IHeld, that the plaintiff being in possession, he could not maintain ejeetment: Corleyj et al.
v. Pentz, 76 Pa.
The return of the sheriff to the writ in ejectment is onlyprimafacie
evidence of defendant's possession and if his evidence rebuts it, he is
entitled to a verdict: .1d.
EQUITY.

Jurisdictionin case of fraudulent Wills-Laches.-A court of equity
has not jurisdiction to avoid a will or to set aside the probate thereof
on the ground of fraud, mistake or forgery; this being within the exelusive jurisdiction of the courts of probate : Case of Broderick's Will,
21 Wall.
Nor will a court of equity give relief by charging the executor of a
will or a legatee with a trust in favor of a third person, alleged to be defrauded by the forged or fraudulent will, where the court of probate
could afford relief by refusing probate of the will in whole or in part:
I.
The same rule applies to devises of real estate, of which the courts of
law have exclusive jurisdiction, except in those states in which they are
subjected to probate jurisdiction : 1d.
Senble that where the courts of probate have not jurisdiction, or
where the period for its further exercise has expired and no laches is
attributable to the injured party, courts of equity will, without disturbing the operation of the will, interpose to give relief to parties injured
by a fraudulent or forged will against those who are in possession of
the decedent's estate or its proceeds, malaIfide, or without consideration : .
But such relief will not be granted to parties who are in laches, as
where from ignorance of the testator's death they made no effort to
obtain relief until eight or nine years ofter the probate of his will : lM.
Ignorance of a fraud committed, which is the ordinary excuse for

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

delay, does not apply in such a case, especially when it is alleged that
the circumstances of the fraud were publicly and generally known at
the d-mieil of the testator shortly after his death : I.
Whilst alterations in the jurisdiction of the state courts cannot affect
the equitablle jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, so
long as the equitable rights themselves remain, yet an enlargement of
equitable rights nay be administered by the Circuit Courts as well as by
the courts of the state : Id.
EVIDENCE.

See Insurance.

Titess-Party-PleadSig-Lapseof Time as a Defence to a Bond.
-When a party is called as a witness by his adversary as on a cross-examination under Act of April 15th 1869, sect. 2, leading questions may
be put to him and there may be drawn from him any fict3 or admissions
which weaken his case or strengthen his adversary's: Brubaker's Admni.istratorv. Tqylor, 76 Pa.
The party so called is to be considered, as if originally offered and
examined on his own behalf: Id.
The testimony of a party so called may be contradicted by prcof of
in, onsistent declarations made our. of court, without giving him an
opportunity of explaining; his declarations, he being a party, are evideuce in themselves : Il.
The plea of" nil debet," to a sealed instrument is bad on general
demurrer ; but if the party goes to trial without objection, it is not
to be treated as a nullity; its effect is the same as upon simple contract:
1d.
A long time, but less than twenty years, hauing elapsed fr)m the
maturity of a sealed note and bringing suit although not long en)ugh to
raise the presumption of payment in law; wo-ld with corroborative
circumstances justify submitting to the jury to presume payment. Such
circumstances in this case : Id.
EXPRESS COMPANY.

See Common Carrier.

FOREIGN JUDG-MENT. See Vnited States Courts.
.Judgnment in, another State-Pleading-Authority of Attorney.Where suit is brougtht on a record which shows that service was not
made on the defendant, but which shows also that an appearance was
entered for him by an attorney of the court, it is not allowable, under a
plea of nul tiel record only, to prove that the attorney had no authority
to appear : hill v. Mlndenhall, 21 Wall.
Presumptively, an attorney of a court of record, who appears for a
party, has authority to appear for him ; and though the party for whom
he has appeared, when sued on a record in which judgment has been
entered against him on such attorney's appearance, may prove that the
attorney had no authority to appear, yet he can do this only on a special plea, or on such plea as under systems which do not follow the common-law system of pleading, is the equivalent of such plea: 1i.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Deed of Trust-Delivery.-WVhen on a bill by a wife against her husband to establish a deed of trust to a third party in her fivor, and now
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in the husband's possession, which deed she alleges that lie executed
and delivered, the husband, in an answer respolsive to her bill. denies
that lie did deliver it, his denial comes to nothing if lie admit in the
same answer certain facts, as, ex. yr., that lie signed and sealed it. aeknowledged it before a proper magistrate, and put it upon record ; faets
which of themselves may, under the circumstances of the case. eonstitute a delivery. In such a case he denies the law simply : Adams v.
Adams, 21 Wall.
When husband and wife join in making a deed of property belonging
to him, to a third party, in trust for the wife, the fact that such party
was not in the least cognisant of what was done, and inever heard of
nor saw the deed until long afterwards, when lie at once refused to accept the trust or in any way to act in it, does not affect the transaction
as between the husband and wife: Id.
A deed by husband and wife conveying by formal words, in prxsenti,
a portion of his real property in trust to a third party, for the wife's separate use, signed, sealed and acknowledged by both parties, al in foirm
and put on record in the appropriate office by the husband, and afterwards spoken of by him to her and to 'other persons as a provision
which he had made for her and her children against accident, here sustained as such trust in her favor, in the face of his answer that lie
never " delivered" the deed, and that owing to the disturbed and revolutionary character of the times (the rebellion then, August 1861, apparently waxing strong), and the threatened condition of the Federal city
and other contingencies growing out of the war, lie had caused the deed
to be made and partially executed, so that upon short notice he could
deliver it and make it effectual, retaining in the meantime the control
of the title ; and that he had himself put it on record, and that it hid
never been out of his possession except for the time necessary to have it
recorded. This decision made, though the person named in the deed
as trustee never heard of the deed until years afterwards, when he was
called on by the wife, she being then divorced from her husband, to
assert the trust: Id.
INSURANCE.

Answers by Insured-Parol Proof to counteract the Paper sgncdEvidence.-The answer to a question put by an insurance company to an
applicant for insurance, on a matter going to affect the risk, as written
down by the agent of the company, when he takes the application for
insurance, and which is signed by the applicant, may be proved by the
evidence of persons who were present, not to have been the answer given
ilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, affirmed:
by the applicant. Insurance Co. v.
Insurance Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall.
The opinion of a medical witness that a person was not worthy of
insurance, in June of one year, is not competent e'idence in a suit on a
policy issued on the 30th of August of the same year; there being no
issue made in the pleadings as to the health of the assured prior to the
date of the policy : 1d.
Under a stipulation that " all original papers filed in the ease" (a
suit against a life insurance company, on a policy of life insurance), and
"which were competent evidence for either side," may be read in evidence, the written opinions of the medical examiner of the company,
and of its agent appointed to examine risks, both made at the time of
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the application for insurance and appended to the proposals for insurance. and both certifying that the risk was a first-class risk, are competent evidence on an issue of fraudulent representation to the company,
to show that the company was not deceived : Id.
Evidence that the general agent of an insurance company, sent by it
to examine into the circumstances connected with the death of a person insured, after so examining, expressed the opinion that it would
" be best for the company to accept the situation and pay the amount
of the policy," is not competent on a suit by the holders of the policy
against the company: Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
LACIES.

See Vendlor.

See Attorney; Equity.

IumITAToNS, STATUTE OF. See Evidence.
Services by a Daughter-Action more than Six Iears after.-A
daughter sued her tther's estate for wages for services after she
att.iined twenty-one, her last services being more than six years before
suit: lebl, that she must prove an express contract and a clear, distinct
and unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt, within
six years of the commencement of suit: l1atson's Execitors v. Stein,
76 Pa.
Where there is a distinct admission of an existing indebtedness for a
specific sum, it is presumed to be a valid debt, and the presumption
mut stand until overthrown by the attending circumstances on other
evidence : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Ra ilroad Crossing-Duty of Traveller-Enidence.-Weber driving a
horse and light wagon over a railroad on the crossing of a county road
was killed by a locomotive moving on the railroad. There was no express testimony as to whether he stopped and looked and listened before
ging on the railroad. Held, that the question of his negligence was
for the jury: PB'nnsylvania Railroad Co. v. Weber. 76 Pa.
It is the duty of a traveller to stop and look and listen before crossing
a railroad: not so doing is negligence in itself: Id.
The presumption in the absence of other evidence is that the traveller
stops and looks and listens, before crossing a railroad : Id.
In an action against a railroad company for injuring such traveller,
the burden is on the defendants to disprove care on part of plaintiff
unless the plaintiff's own evidence shows contributory negligence: IM.
Although from the uncontradicted evidence in this case it might have
been infbrred that if the traveller had stopped and looked and listened
he would have seen the approaching train, it was for the jury to determine the fact: Id.
OFFICER.
Appointment of not a Contract.-By law the first meeting of county
commissioners commenced on the first Monday in February in each year;
on that day they appointed a clerk for one year from the first day of the
succeeding April : Held to be in excess of their authority-the appointment should be made each year: Koontz v. Franklin County, 76 Pa
The appointment of a public officer and the services rendered by bin)
are not in the nature of a contract: Id.
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There can be no express or implied contract for the permanence of a
salary of a public officer, unless as specifically provided in the Constitution: Id.
See Bond.
SURETY.
TAXATION.

Agreement by State to exempt must he clear.-A railroad 455 miles
long, forty-two miles of which were in a state other than that by which
it was incorporated, held to be" doing business" within the state where
the forty-two miles were, within the meaning of an act taxing all railroad companies "doing business within the state and upon whose road
freight may be transported :" Erie Railway Co. v. .Pennsylvania,21
Wall.
It being settled law that the language by which a state surrenders its
right of taxation, must be clear and unmistakable, a grant by one state
to a corporation of another state to exercise a part of its franchise within
the limits of the state making the grant, as above said. and laying a tax
upon it at the time of the grant, does not, of itself, preclude a right of
further taxation by the same state : id.
TRESPASS.

Lies for a Continuance of a Wrongfid E rection.-The mere continuance of a structure tortiously erected upon another's land, even after
recovery and satisfaction of a judgment for its wrongful erection, is a
trespass for which another action of trespass guare clausum will lie
Russell v. Brown, 63 Me.
TRUST.
UNITED

See Husband and Wife.

STATES COURTS.

See Admir'alty; Equity.

Review of Judgment of State Courts by the Stpreme Court.-When,
in a case in a state court, a right or immunity is set up under and by
virtue of a judgment of a court of the United States, and the decision
is against such right or immunity, a case is presented for removal and
review by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States under
the Act of February 5th 1867 : Dipasseurv. Rochereau, 21 Wall.
In such a case, the Supreme Court will examine and inquire whether
or not due validity and effect have been accorded to the judgment of
the Federal court, and if they have not, and the right or immunity
claimed has been thereby lost, it will reverse the judgment of the state
court: Id.
Whether due validity and effect have or have not been accorded to
the judgment of the Federal court will depend on thecircumstances of
the case. If jurisdiction of the case was acquired only by reason of
the citizenship of the parties, and the state law alone was administered,
then only such validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment as
would be due to a judgment of the state courts under like circumstances : d.
Judgment was rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States for
Louisiana on a vendor's privilege and mortgage, declaring it to be the
first lien and privilege on the land ; and the marshal sold the property
clear of all prior liens; and the mortgagee purchased, and paid into
court for the benefit of subsequent liens, the surplus of his bid beyond
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the amount of his own debt.

This judgment and sale were set up by
way of defence to a suit brought in the state court by another mortgagee, who claimed priority to the first mortgage, and who had not been
made a party to the suit in the Circuit Court.. Tihe state court held
that the plaintiff was not bound by the fbrmer judgment on the question
of priority, not being a party to the suit. The ease was brought to the
Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error, and this court
held, that the state court did not refuse to accord due force and effect
to the judgment; that such a judgment in the state courts would not
be conclusive on the point in question, and the judgment of the Circuit
Court could not have any greater force or effect than judgments in the
state courts: It.
USAGE.

See Bills and Notes.
VENDOR.

Agency-Delivery-zhtention-lntoxicatingLiquors.-It is a question
of fict for the jury whether or not, when goods have been intrusted to
a common carrier to be carried to a consignee, that is a delivery to the
consignee for himself or as agent for another, though the existence of
any such agency- has never been disclosed to the vendors: State of
la(ble v. .Jutoxicating Liquors, and James Garland, claimant, 63 Me.
The disposition to be made of liquors libelled, as kept for unlawful
sale, must be decided by the determination of the jury as to the intention in this respect, of the person who owns them, or who has authority from the owner to sell them. A design on the part of one who
is a mere bailce of the owner (without authority from him to make
sales) illegally to sell such liquors in this state, will not work a forfeiture: L.

WIL .

See Equity.

of Executorfor Assets.-By his will
Provision-T'hat is-iability
a testator left certain real and personal estate to his widow during
her life and widowhood, to revert to his heirs upon her death or marriage, and bequeathed the residue of his estate to his father. Two
months after the testator's death, a child was born of his widow
held, that the reversionary clause above mentioned was not a provision
for the child, under R. S., c. 74. § 8, and that, by virtue of that section, it took the same share in the estate that it would, had its father
died intestate: Waterman v. Ifawkins, 63 Me.
The judge of probate can only be relieved of the duty cast upon him
by R. S., c. 74, § 8, of assigning to a posthumous child its share of its
father's estate, by provision being made specifically for the unborn child.
Ile cannot he disinherited, like a child living when the will is made, by
its appearing that the omission to name him was intentional : (l.
The widow seasonably waived the provisions of the will intended for
her benefit : held, that, the child's share was properly taken wholly from
the estate given to the residuary legatee: Id.
That the executor has delivered the bequeathed property to the legatee of it, before the birth of the child, is no defence to a suit brought
for the child's benefit upon the executor's bond, to obtain its shar. ;
especially where the Court of Probate has made a decree, not .appealed from, establishing and assigning such share under R. S., c. 74, § 8:

id.

